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Abstract 
AODV is a routing protocol that is designed for MANETs and it is using the on-demand routing method to establish 
the routes between nodes. The main benefit of this protocol is establishment of desired routes to destination when the 
source node requires and it keeps the routes as long as they are needed. The black hole attack is a common attack that 
can be accrued in AODV protocols. In this kind of attack, the attacker uses of one or more malicious nodes which 
advertise themselves in the network by setting a zero metric to all the destinations that causes all the nodes toward 
the data packets to these malicious nodes. The AODV is vulnerable against black hole attacks due to having network 
centric property, where all the nodes have to share their routing tables for each other. In this paper, we present the 
survey of existing mitigation methods that have been proposed to secure AODV.  
Keywords: Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET); Black hole attack; Cooperative Black hole attack; Ad-hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (AODV). 
 
1. Introduction  
Mobile Ad-hoc Network is a group of mobile nodes without any fixed infrastructure therefore the nodes 
communicate with each other based on the unconditional trust. The security is more complicated in MANET when 
compared with ordinary network which the intruder may get physical access to the wired link or pass over security 
holes at firewalls and routers. Mobile ad hoc network does not have a well-defined line of protection due to its 
infrastructure-free and each node shall be prepared for any threat. In wireless ad-hoc networks, the most important 
concern is routing issues. Actually, the old-fashioned techniques are not suitable in MANETs thus there is a need to 
modify current  TCP/IP model to provide efficient functionality which has been made the routing protocols as key 
research area for investigators and challenging task as well. There are various routing protocols in MANET which 
are categorized in term of functionality as following: reactive protocols, proactive protocols and hybrid protocol. 
Reactive protocols are known as On Demand Reactive protocols which never initiate route discovery, unless they are 
requested by a source node. Proactive routing protocols maintain the updated topology of the network and each node 
knows the other nodes in the network in advance. Hybrid protocol is created by exploiting the benefits of both 
reactive and proactive protocols which could be used to achieve better results.  These protocols suffer various 
attacks that advertise themselves in the entire network. (i.e. black hole attack, worm hole attack, gray hole attack, etc) 
In this paper, the aim is to investigate on AODV routing protocols in term of black hole attacks. Black hole is one of 
the most common attacks against the AODV routing protocol. The black hole attack will disrupt the network and 
affect the whole network performance. The malicious node in a black hole will pretend to have the shortest and 
freshest route to the destination node by manipulating the control message to forge other nodes to send their data 
through its node. 
 
2. Over view of AODV routing protocol 
AODV has been considered as reactive protocol which uses control messages (i.e. Route Request message (RREQ), 
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Route Reply Message (RREP) and Route Error Message (RERR) ) to discover a route to destination. This protocol 
establishes a route when a node wishes to communicate with the other node which it has no route; therefore AODV 
will offer topology information for the node.  Two phases of this protocol are described below. 
2.1 Route Discovery 
        When a source node wishes to transmit data packets, it sends a REEQ to its neighbors. The neighbors act 
by two ways.  If there is an available valid route to destination, they will reply RREP to the source node. But if 
there is no a valid route, they will rebroadcast RREQ to their neighbors. While transmitting a RREQ packet, every 
neighbor node enters the previous node’s address and its Bid. . A timer associated with each entry is also maintained 
by the node in an attempt to remove a RREQ packet in case the reply has not been received before it expires. Figure 
1 illustrates an example of route discovery mechanism in AODV. Suppose that node “A” wants to forward a data 
packet to another node (destination) “G”. The source node sends a RREQ to its neighbors. As shown, the neighbors 
do not have an available   route to destination hence; the neighbors also forward RREQ to their neighbors until 
finding a node which has a fresh enough route to destination or destination node is located itself. 
      
                       Figure 1. Route discovery in AODV 
2.2 Rout maintenance  
     The route maintenance mechanism works as following: if a node finds a link down that makes one or more 
than one link inaccessible from the source node or neighbors nodes, it broadcasts an RERR to inform the source node 
and the end node. This is depicted in figure 2.3 which shows the link between “E” and “G” is broken hence a RERR 
message will be generated in node “E” and send to the source node to notify this node.  
 
 
                     Figure2. Route maintenance in AODV 
3. Black hole Attack on AODV Routing Protocol 
The black hole attack includes malicious nodes that forge the nodes to drop the data packets. When a source node 
wishes to communicate with the other nodes or transmits the data packets to the destination, it sends a RREQ to its 
neighbors to know the true path to the destination. If there is one or more malicious node (black hole node), it 
receives the RREQ then sends a fake RREP to sender which shows malicious node already has a true path to the 
destination and this RREP message includes false routing information and fake higher sequence number that shows it 
is a fresh path. When the sender of RREQ receives the RREP, it assumes the malicious node as true node then it 
transmits the data packets within the route that specified by black hole node. Black hole nodes receive the data 
packets without sending the packets to the destination or the other nodes. By creating routing loops, network 
congestion and channel contention, attackers degrades the network performance. This kind of attack is illustrated in 
the figure 3. The source node transmits RREQ packets to its neighbor nodes “B” and “D” to discover fresh route to 
the destination “F”. The black hole node ”M” immediately respond to the source node without checking its routing 
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table to say it has a fresh path to the intended destination which is done by sending a fake RREP to the source node 
“A”. The source node “A” considers that the route discovery has been done then rejects other RREP message from 
other nodes. Then, the attacker will drop the received packets without sending to the destination “F”. 
 
          
.                        Figure 3: Single Black hole attack 
However, in case of multiple black hole nodes which act in coordination the level of detectability is low. In this form 
of black hole attack, multiple black hole nodes are cooperating with each other to attack the intended node or 
network. For example, as shown in figure 4, the black hole node “B” is cooperating with black hole node “B2” which 
is its teammate as the next hop.  
 
             
                           Figure 4. Cooperative black hole attack  
4. Solutions to Black hole Attack in MANET 
         Deng [4] used On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) and proposed a solution for black holes attacks. This 
solution related to when an intermediate node applies for RREQ, the RREP packet should be included information 
about the next hop to destination. Next, the source node sends a further request (FREQ) to next hop of replied node 
to know about replied node and route to the destination. This approach may help to identify the reliability of the 
replied node if the next hop is trusted. But the drawback of this solution is related to cooperative black hole attacks 
on MANETs. This approach could be used for individual attacks but cannot avoid cooperative attacks. For instance, 
if the next hop also cooperate with the replied node, “yes “ which will be replied for both question and the source 
node will trust on next hop and send data within the replied node that may be a black hole node 
        Sun Guan and Chen [1] used On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) as their routing protocol. The detection 
scheme utilized neighborhood-based technique to discover the black hole attacks and represent a routing recovery 
protocol to create a reliable route to the destination. They designed a method with two parts to encounter with black 
hole attack. These parts are included: detection and response. The authors simulated their work by NS2 and the 
results illustrated that the scheme effectively is able to find black hole attack with no much control overhead to the 
network. The authors discovered that the amount of passing packet over the network might be enhanced by at least 
15% and the false positive possibility will be less than 1.7%. This scheme will be failed to detect black hole attack 
when that attacker decides to forge the fake reply packets selectively and detection of cooperative black hole attack 
was the next problem of their solution. 
          A study has been conducted by Latha Tamilselvan [7] who proposed a solution to enhance the original 
AODV protocol. This concept was designed by setting timer in the RimerExpiredTable to collect the other request 
from other nodes when receiving the first request. The packet’s sequence number and the received time will be stored 
in a Collect Route Reply Table (CRRT), calculating the timeout value based on the arriving time of the first route 
request then it judges the validation of the route based on the threshold value. The author simulated this solution by 
(GloMoSim) and results indicate that packet delivery ratio was improved with low delay and overhead. 
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      Shurman and Park [10] used two techniques to avoid the black hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks. The 
first technique will find at least two routes from the source to the destination node. The second technique is related to 
number of unique sequence used. The authors simulated the proposed approach by NS2 and they confirmed that 
these techniques have less numbers of RREQ and RREP in comparison with current AODV. Second technique might 
be better than first technique due to the sequence number which is contained all packet in the original routing 
protocol. These techniques were failed to discover cooperative black hole attacks. 
          Chang, Rei Heng, Cheng, and Shun Chao Chang [2] conducted a study on distributed and collaborative 
procedure which was proposed to detect black hole nodes. This cooperative procedure works as following:Each node 
finds the local anomalies.The sender node sends a message to the neighbor of the infected node by calling a 
cooperative detective.Each node gathers information over overhearing packets to recognize the suspicious nodes, 
when recognizing one, the detecting node will initiate the local detection procedure to evaluate whether the 
suspicious one is a malicious black hole node. If one node is confirmed as a black hole node, the global reaction will 
notify the entire of network by sending a warning message. This solution used of the voting scheme which means 
participating all the nodes to vote to a infected node. This approach help to detect the individual black hole nodes but 
when an attacker uses cooperative black hole node to impersonate the nodes the voting scheme and detection of 
cooperative attacks will be complex and impossible. 
          Satoshi Kurosawa, Hidehisa Nakayama, Nei Kato, Abbas Jamalipour, and Yoshiaki Nemoto [12] 
proposed a dynamic learning approach to find black hole attack in MANET. This method was intend to observe the 
characteristic change of node within a given time and a node will be recognized as black hole node if its 
characteristic change goes over the particular time.  The Characteristics will be observed in the number of sent 
RREQs and the number of received RREPs and the mean destination sequence numbers of RREQs and RREPs. This 
approach is not able to isolate the black hole nodes due to absence of detection mode such as revising the AODV 
protocol. Moreover, this comes with bigger processing overhead and the determination of optimal threshold values 
remains unresolved. 
 
        Payal , Swadas [11] used AODV as their routing protocol by proposing a dynamic learning system to 
detect black hole attack based on MANET to avoid black hole attack by notifying the other nodes in the network. 
Generally, a node receives RREP packet and it checks first the value of sequence number in its routing table. If the 
sequence number is higher than the threshold value, it will be considered as malicious node. The threshold value will 
be dynamically updated in the time interval. The threshold value is the average of the difference of destination 
sequence number in each time slot between the sequence number in the routing table and the RREP packet. The 
authors used of advantage of AODV protocol that the source node announces the black hole to its neighbors in order 
to be refused and removed. Also, deploying the dynamic learning system improved the average end-to-end delay and 
normalized routing overhead. However, if a cooperative attack occurs in MANET, detecting process will be too 
complex so, this solution cannot be used for cooperative attacks. 
 
      In a study Djenouri and Badache [5] presented an approach for monitoring, detecting and eliminating the 
black hole attacks in mobile ad hoc network. In the first phase (monitoring), an effective method of random two-hop 
ACK was used. The authors used a Bayesian approach for node accusation which was deployed to enable node 
redemption before judgment. The benefit of this approach is to prevent false accusation attacks vulnerability and 
reducing the false positives which can be occurred by channel conditions and nodes mobility. This approach might 
be used for all types of packet droppers, selfish and malicious nodes that cause a black hole attack. This solution was 
able to detect attacker when dropping the packets. The authors used GloMoSim simulator to simulate their approach 
and they stated that the random two-hop ACK would be considered as effective as the normal two-hop ACK in high 
true and low false detection but greatly decreasing the overhead more than ordinary two-hop ACK. This approach 
used cooperatively witness-based verification however, it not able to prevent to collaborative black hole attacks and 
multiple malicious nodes. 
 
     Hesiri Weerasinghe [6] used a methodology to detect multiple black hole nodes that working collaboratively as 
a collection to begin cooperative black hole attacks.  Actually, this author used Data Routing Information (DRI) 
table and cross checking using Further Request (FREQ) and Further Reply (FREP) to produce a slightly modified 
version of ADOV protocol. In this paper, the focus has been on the cooperative black hole attacks in MANET routing. 
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This solution has been compared with the currently available solution proposed by Deng (op. cit.) and also the 
performance of both solutions compared with original AODV by QualNet simulator in term of throughput, packet 
loss rate, end-to-end delay and control packet overhead. The author confirmed that original AODV and solution 
proposed by Deng (op. cit.) deeply suffer from multiple black hole attacks and this new solution can present better 
performance in compare to the previous solutions in term of throughput rate and minimum packet loss. However, this 
solution also could not solve completely cooperative attacks. 
       Rutvij, Sankita and Devesh [13] investigated on some of the existing approaches for black hole and gray 
hole attack and presented a novel solution against these attacks which is able to find effectively short and secure 
routes to destination. Their theoretical analysis illustrated that this approach properly can increase packet delivery 
ratio (PDR) with negligible difference in routing overhead. The authors believed that this algorithm could be used for 
the other reactive protocol and also finds and eliminates malicious  
nodes within the route finding phase. Nodes receiving RREP confirm the truth of routing information; source node 
broadcasts a list of malicious nodes when sending RREQ. Nodes update route tables when they get any information 
of malicious nodes from received routing packets. No additional control packet can be mentioned as benefit of this 
algorithm and there is minor difference in routing overhead which is the ratio of the number of routing related 
transmissions to the number of data related transmissions. Additionally, the malicious nodes would be isolated and 
packet delivery ratio (PDR) will greatly be improved.  
 
5. Comparison of Various Solutions to Black hole Attack  
The various solutions to black hole attacks proposed by several authors are analyzed and made a comparison based 
on important parameters and depicted in Table 1. 
 
The detection techniques which make use of reactive routing protocols have low overheads, but have high packet 
loss problem. Most of the discussed solutions, in particular Method1, Method2, Method3, Method4, Method 5, 
Method 6, Method 7 and Method 8 suffer to detect cooperative black hole attacks. The authors did not focus on the 
behavior of black hole attacks when they are cooperating in a group.  In contrast, Method9 and Method10 present 
good performance in terms of throughput and minimum packet loss percentage compared to other solutions and 
original AODV which is affected by cooperative black holes. Based on performance results shown in Table 1, we can 
conclude that Method9 and Method10 outperform the other detection methods. However simulating more features 
could increase one’s detection rate, the feature-selection activity can be computationally expensive on the node itself. 
Hence, understating both performance and cost impacts of proposed solutions is an important task which helps to 
find out the method best suited to the specific requirements of the operational environments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the numerous researches done in term of black hole attack on AODV-based MANETs. 
There are several proposals for detection and mitigation of black hole attacks in MANETs. However, most of 
solutions are not properly working against single black hole attacks and they suffer of detection of cooperative black 
hole attacks. The author has made a comparison between the existing solutions, but there is no reliable procedure 
since most of the solutions are having more time delay, much network overhead because of newly introduced packets 
and some mathematical calculations. In conclusion, the author recommends that using the hybrid techniques could be 
a proper way to detect cooperative black hole attacks. For future work, to find an effective solution to the black hole 
attack on AODV protocol which can be proposed via simulation to give better network performance in terms of 
various network parameters like Packet Delivery ratio, End to End Delay, throughput, and mobility. 
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Table 1: Comparison of available solutions  
Technique proposed by  
 
Techniques / 
Solutions  
 
Routing 
protocol 
 
Introduced 
new packets  
(yes/no)  
Modifies AODV/ 
Routing 
tables(yes/no)  
 
Type of attack 
 
Results 
Deng,2002  Further request  
(FREQ) 
AODV yes No  Single Black 
hole 
Routing overhead,  
Cannot prevent 
cooperative black holes.  
Sun Guan and 
Chen,2003 
 
Neighborhood based 
technique 
 
AODV No No Single Black 
hole 
Not able to 
detect 
cooperative 
attack 
Shurman , Yoo S, 
Park ,2004 
Using two novel 
techniques  
AODV Yes  Yes  Single black 
hole 
Time delay 
Satoshi Kurosawa, 
2007 
Dynamic learning 
approach 
AODV Yes  Yes  Single Black 
hole 
Bigger processing 
overhead  
 Tamilselvan L, 
Sankaranarayanan V 
(2007) 
Time-based 
Threshold detection 
Scheme  
 
AODV Yes No  Single black 
hole 
The increase of 
end-to-end delay when 
the malicious node is 
away from source node 
Chang,Tung- 
Kuang (2007) 
 
Voting scheme AODV Yes Yes Single black 
hole 
 
Not able to 
detect 
cooperative 
attack 
Djenouri and Badache  
(2008) 
Random Two- hop 
ACK and Bayesian 
Detection Scheme 
AODV Yes Yes Single black 
hole 
 
Not able to detect 
cooperative black hole 
attack 
 
Payal,Swadas,2009 
Dynamic learning 
system 
AODV 
 
Yes  Yes   
Single black 
hole 
Improve the average end 
to end delay and 
normalized routing 
overhead 
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Data Routing 
Information (DRI) 
table and cross 
checking 
AODV Yes  Yes  Cooperative 
black hole 
Better performance in 
compare with Deng (op. 
cit.)  and ordinary 
AODV 
Rutvij, Sankita and 
Devesh (2012) 
Using intermediate 
node to detect 
malicious node 
AODV Yes  Yes  Cooperative 
black hole 
Improve Protocol 
Delivery Ratio ( PDR) 
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